Goodspeed v. Shippen Appellant\u27s Reply Brief Dckt. 38829 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
4-4-2012
Goodspeed v. Shippen Appellant's Reply Brief
Dckt. 38829
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"Goodspeed v. Shippen Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 38829" (2012). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 3656.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/3656
I~ THE SCPRL\IE COLRT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
\\,ILLIA;\I SHA W~ GOODSPEED, ) 
and SHELLEE BETH GOODSPEED, ) 
) 
Plain tiffsiResponden ts, ) Docket ~o. 38829-20 I { 
) 
vs. ) Jefferson County Case: CV-2009-15 
) 
ROBERT D. SHIPPE;..' and ) 




APPELLA~TS' REPLY BRIEF 
Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District for Jefferson County 
Honorable Gregory S. Anderson, District Judge, Presiding 
DUl\~ LA \\' OFFICES, PLLC 
Robin D. Dunn, Esq., ISB 1\0. 2903 
P.O. Box 277 
477 Pleasant Country Lane 
Rigb~Idaho 83442 
(208) 745-9202 (t) 
(208) 745-8160 (f) 
rdunn@dunnlawoffices.com 
Attorney for Appellants 
l\ELSON HALL PARRY TUCKER, PA 
\Veston S. Davis, Esq., ISB 1\0. 7449 
P.O. Box 51630 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405 
(208) 522-3001 (t) 
(208) 523-7254 (f) 
\vsdavis@nhptlaw.net 
Attorney for Respondents 
2012 
TABLE OF CO~TE;\;TS 
TA.BLE OF CO:"TE:"TS ............................................................................................................... i 
TABLE OF AUTI-IORITIES ....................................................................................................... .ii 
GE:"ER~"\L ISSUES 0:" APPEAL ............................................................................................... 1 
I. Did the Court crr by granting a new trial on the issue of "breach of implied ............................................. 1 
warranty of habitability" which set aside the jury verdict on this isolated count in ........................................... 1 
the Plaintiffs' Third Amended Complaint" .......................................................................................................... I 
') Did the District Court err in granting a new trial on the basis of stating that the jury ................................ I 
should haw been instructed regarding disclaimer of the implied warranty of habitability, and that Plaintiffs 
were entitled to a new trial on their breach of implied warranty of habitability claim" ...................................... I 
3. Attorneys' fees and costs should be a\varded to Appellants at trial and on appeal. ................................... I 
ARGL]lE/VT ........................................................................................................................................................... 3 
CO:"CLUSIO:" ............................................................................................................................ 13 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE .................................................................................................. 16 
APPELLA-"TS' REPLY BRIEF 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
All-States Leasing Co. v. Bass, 96 Idaho 873,538 P.2d 1177 (1975) ............................................ 6 
Baker v. Promark Products FVest, Inc., 692 S.W.2d 844, 846 (Tenn. 1985» ................................. 6 
Baltimore & Carolina Line v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654,659-61 (1935) .......................................... .4 
Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. vVestover, 359 U.S. 500, 501 (1959) ....................................................... .4 
Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 91, Idaho 55, 68, 415 P. 2d 698. 711 (1966) ............................................. 11 
Big Butte Ranch, Inc. v. Grasmick. 91 Idaho 6, 415 P.2d 48 (1966) .............................................. 9 
Cate v. Dover Corp., 790 SW 2d 559,562 (Texas, 1990) .............................................................. 8 
Clements Farms, Inc. v. Ben Fish & Son, 814 P. 2d 917 (Idaho, 1991) ......................................... 6 
Dale's Service Co., Inc. v. Jones, 96 Idaho 662,534 P.2d 1102 (1975) ...................................... 3, 9 
Dickerson v. Mountain ViC'vt: Equipment Co., 109 Idaho 711, 716, 710 P.2d 621, 626 (Ct.App. 
1985) .............................................................................................................................................. 12 
Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474 (1935) .................................................................................... 3, 13 
Dunford v. United o.f Omaha, 95 Idaho 282, 506 P.2d 1355 (1973) ............................................... 9 
Fargo Alaelz. & Tool Co. v. Kearney & Trecker Corp., 428 F. Supp. 364, 372 (Dist. Court, ED 
Mich, 1977) ..................................................................................................................................... 8 
Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. United States, 187 U.S. 315, 321-22 (1902) ......................................... .4 
Gallov.:ay v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 397-98 (1943) .............................................................. .4 
Glenn Dick Equipment Co. v. Galey Construction, Inc., 97 Idaho 216, 222, 541 P.2d 1184, 1190 
(1975) .............................................................................................................................................. 7 
Leavit v. S'vvain, 133 Idaho 624, 628, 991 P.2d 349, 353 (1999) ......................................... 1,10,12 
Alartineau v. Walker, 97 Idaho 246, 542 P.2d 1165 (1975) .......................................................... 12 
Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 312 (1930) ......................................................................... 3 
Quickv. Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 764, 727P,2d 1187, 1192(1986) ................................................. 1 
R & W Leasing v. Mosher, 195 Mont. 285, 636 P.2d 832,835 (1981) ........................................... 6 
Rockefeller v. GrabO'vv, 136 Idaho 637, 645, 39 P.3d 577,585 (2001) ..................................... 1, 13 
Smith v. Sharpensteen, 521 P.2d 394 (Ok1.1974 ) ............................................................................ 8 
Tennessee-Carolina Transport v. Strick. 283 N.C. 423,196 S.E.2d 711 (1973) ............................ 8 
U. S. Fibres v. Proctor & ScJnt'artz, 509 F.2d 1043 (CA 6 1975) .................................................. 8 
Walker v. New iVfexico & s. Pac. R.R., 165 U.S. 593,598 (1897) ................................................. .4 
Werry v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 97 Idaho 130,540 P.2d 792 (1975) ........................................... 9 
Williams v. College Dodge, 11 U.c.c. Rep. Servo (Mich. Dist. Ct., 1972) .................................... 8 
Other Authorities 
3 W. Blackstone, Commentaries at 1340 (1898) ......................................................................... 2, 3 
Implied Warranties of Quality in Non-Sales Cases. 57 Colum. L. Rev. 653 (1957) ...................... 7 
Special Project Article Two Warranties in Commercial Transactions: An Update, 72 Cornell L. 
Rev. 1159 (1987) ............................................................................................................. , ............... 7 
The Federalist j\10, 81 and 83 .......................................................................................................... 3 
APPELLA.'iTS' REPLY BRIEF ii 
The ["n£form Commercial Code as a Premise/or Judicial Reasoning, 65 Colum, L Rev, 880, 
888 (1965)) , .. ,'" .. " ........................................................................................................................... 8 
C.S. C00iST. Amend. VII. .............................................................................................................. 3 
Rules 
Rule 59(a)(7) ............................................................................................................................. 1.16 
Regulations 
Section 1-201(10) ............................................................................................................................ 8 
Section 2-316 ................................................................................................................................... 9 
UCC ..................................................................................................................................... 5, 6, 7, 8 
APPELLA:"TS' REPLY BRIEF iii 
GENERAL ISSrES ON APPEAL 
1. Did the Court err by granting a nell trial on the issue of "breach of implied 
\varranty of habitability" which set aside the jury verdict on this isolated count in 
the Plaintiffs' Third Amended Complaint? 
2. Did the District Court err in granting a new trial on the basis of stating that the jury 
should have been instructed regarding disclaimer of the implied warranty of 
habitability, and that Plaintiffs were entitled to a new trial on their breach of 
implied warranty of habitability claim? 
3. Attorneys' fees and costs should be awarded to Appellants at trial and on appeal. 
STANDARD OF REVTE\V 
Only "where prejudicial errors of law have occUlTed" has the district court "a duty to 
grant a new trial under Rule 59(a)(7), even though the verdict is supported by substantial and 
competent evidence." Rockefeller v. Grahovv, 136 Idaho 637, 645,39 P.3d 577, 585 (2001). But 
whether to grant a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (J0JOV) "is purely a question 
of law." Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 764, 727 P,2d 1187, 1192 (1986). Therefore, the factual 
determinations of the jury should not be questioned. The party moving for J0JOV "admits the 
truth of all adverse evidence and all inferences that can be drawn legitimately from it." Leavit v. 
S,vain. 133 Idaho 624, 628, 991 P.2d 349, 353 (1999). The court must determine whether there is 
substantial evidence upon which a jury could have found for the non-moving party. Jd. (emphasis 
added). The court may not reweigh the evidence or consider the credibility 0 f the witnesses and 
will not grant J~OV unless it finds that there could have been but one conclusion as to the 
verdict reasonable minds could have reached and the jury failed to reach it. Id. (emphasis added). 
Conflicting circumstantial evidence is enough to withstand a motion for J:'\OV. 
APPELL·\:\'TS' REPLY BRIEF 
OVERVIE\V 
1. Jury verdicts should be given special weight and not second-guessed by a trial 
court. 
2. The facts support the ,jury verdict on all counts including habitability. 
3. The plaintiffs, buyus, have resided in the house since the purchase. The house 
has never been non-habitable. 
4. The leaching system had no problems for the first year and during the time the 
seller 'vas allowed to inspect such system. 
S. The plaintiffs/respondents failed to winterize or properly maintain the pump. 
The pump line to the leach area may have been cut by the plaintiffs during 
installation of sprinklers. 
6. The respondents never proved to the ,jury any breach of warranty of 
habitability. Furthermore, the respondents presumed a sub water problem but 
never proved causation. The Jury had sufficient facts to rule for the appellants 
and did so. 
7. The respondents drafted the contract provided to the appellants. Further, the 
respondents' realtor had thirty (30) years of service and explained the contract 
to the respondents. The respondents understood the contract provided to sellers. 
8. The respondents initialed each page of the contract and indicated the contract 
was understood. 
9. The liCC definition of conspicuous is not applicable to the standard for home 
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sales. It may be useful for analogy and the Lee notes thereto. 
10. The lo\ver court held in abeYance fees for the appellants until this court ruled. 
Fees should have been granted since appellants prevailed on all counts with the 
jury. Fees should be granted to appellants for this appeal. 
ARGU;\lE~T 
1. Jury verdicts are to be respected. 
The right of trial by jury is of ancient origin, characterized by Blackstone as "the glory of 
the English law" and "the most transcendent privilege which any subject can enjoy" (Bk. 3, p. 
379); See: Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474 (1935). With few exceptions, trial by jury has always 
been, and still is, generally regarded as the normal and preferable mode of disposing of issues of 
fact in civil cases at law as \vell as in criminal cases. Id. Maintenance of the jury as a fact-
finding body is of such importance and occupies so firm a place in our history and jurisprudence 
that any curtailment of the right to a jury trial should be scrutinized with the utmost care. Id. 
Compare: Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 312 (1930). 
Thomas Jefferson stated that he considered "trial by jury [to be] the greatest anchor ever 
yet devised by humankind for holding a government to the principles of its constitution." 
Thomas Jefferson, 1792 (quoted by Judge William G. Young Speech at the Florida State Bar's 
Annual Convention in Orlando, June 28, 2007). Indeed, the seventh amendment to the United 
States Constitution guarantees a litigant the right to a jury trial. U.S. CO:-;ST. Amend. VII. This 
\vas important initially due to English oppression of American colonists causing the framers of 
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the Constitution to place great importance on the right to a jury trial which has continued on until 
today. See: Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 C.S. 500,501 (1959) (reasoning that right to 
jury trial is of such historical importance that courts strictly should scrutinize any infringement of 
that right). In analyzing the right to a jury trial, Blackstone asselied that the concept of a civil 
jury trial was one of the most glorious concepts of the English law. 3 W. Blackstone, 
Commentaries at 1340 (1898). The preference for jury trials was so embedded in earl y American 
jurisprudence that Alexander Hamilton even proposed that in order to protect the "sanctity" of 
the jury trial, juries, instead of judges, should reviev/ civil jury verdicts that parties appealed. 
See: The Federalist No. 81 and 83. See also: Gallovmy v. United States, 319 u.S. 372, 397-98 
(1943) (Black, J .. dissenting) (analyzing Alexander Hamilton's view of civil jury trial). 
Of course, it is true that administrative procedures occasionally prevent juries from 
resolving disputes but despite conflicting with the seventh amendment's guarantee to a jury trial, 
such procedures have withstood constitutional challenges. See: Baltimore & Carolina Line v. 
Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 659-61 (1935) (detennining that judgment notwithstanding verdict did 
not violate pmiy's right to jury trial); Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. United States, 187 U.S. 315, 321-
22 (1902) (ascertaining that summary judgment did not detract from pmiy's right to jury trial); 
Walker v. New Mexico & s. Pac. R.R., 165 C.S. 593, 598 (1897) (holding that special verdict did 
not violate defendant's right to jury trial). However, in Redman (supra), the United States 
Supreme Court recognized that courts should only grant a judgment notwithstanding the verdict 
if, as a matter oflaw, the jury bases the verdict on insufficient evidence. rd. For reasons that shall 
be set forth belov/, Appellants submit to this Court that the trial court did in fact err in granting a 
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judgment notwithstanding the verdict and ordering a new trial because the jury's decision \vas 
based on sufficient evidence and there were no unanswered questions of Imv upon ,,\'hich to base 
its J0:0V or order for a ne"v triaL 
Actual kno\'Vledge trumps the need for disclaimer to be "conspicuous." 
At triaL the jury ruled in favor of the defendants/appellants on all issues (including a 
finding of no liability with regard to any breach of the implied warranty of habitability), Whether 
or not the \'erdict was based on a finding that the implied wan"anty of habitability was validly 
disclaimed, or that the warranty was simply not breached is unknown, It is uncontested, however, 
that the language contained within that agreement regarding any disclaimer of the implied 
warranty of habitability was not typed in an alternate font, in bold, caps, italics, or othenvise 
written in such a way that it would be stylistically distinguishable from the other typesetting 
contained near it on the page, Respondents submit to this Court that such style is required to 
make thc language "conspicuous" and that such conspicuity is required in order for the 
disclaimer to be valid. Accordingly, Respondents assert the trial court's refusal to give 
instruction to the jury to invalidate any disclaimer which failed to meet the requirements of 
conspicuity was error. The trial court ultimately granted a judgment notwithstanding the verdict 
on such a basis and ordered a new trial, however the trial court (and Respondents) failed to 
understand that conspicuity is not necessary to disclaim \varranties in all cases. 
A. The vee can apply to this case by analogy despite not being for the sale of goods. 
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The Court \vill notice that many of the cases in SUppOli of Appellants' position that are to 
follow hereafter are based on the UCC which is usually applied to the sale of goods and 
Appellants are \vel\ aware that this case is not based on the sale of goods. But the CCC need not 
onlv be applied to the sale of goods. See: Clements Farms, Inc. v. Ben Fish & Son, 814 P. 2d 917 
(Idaho, 1991). Indeed, Idaho courts have applied CCC provisions by analogy to a variety of 
transactions other than sales, such as to leases, bailments and loans. Ie!. See also: All-States 
Leasing Co. v. Bass, 96 Idaho 873, 538 P.2d 1177 (1975) (applying the UCC to a lease and 
specifically expressed its disagreement with decisions in a few other states, where courts have 
refused to extend Code warranties to non-sale transactions without express legislative 
authorization. Compare: R & W Leasing v. ;V/osher, 195 Mont. 285. 636 P.2d 832, 835 (1981); 
Baker v. Promark Products "Vest, [nc .. 692 S.W.2d 844, 846 (Tenn. 1985)). 
Further, this Court has previously acknowledged criticism of decisions from other states 
that construe the applicability of the CCC too narrowly on the basis that by so doing, the intent 
of the UCC's drafters is violated. Clements Farms. Inc. v. Ben Fish & Son, 814 P. 2d 936. See 
also: UCC section 1-102, which states that the Code should "be liberally construed and applied 
to promote its underlying purposes and policies." Compare: Special Project Article Two 
Warranties in Commercial Transactions: An Update, 72 Comell L. Rev. 1159 (1987). 
In All-States Leasing, this Court stated that one purpose of applying UCC warranties by 
analogy is that "implied \varranties can be extended to many transactions \vhich could not be 
defined as sales but \vhich are so like other cases \vhere warranties are implied that they should 
be treated similarly." 96 Idaho at 878, 538 P.2d at 1182 (quoting Famsworth, Implied ~Varranties 
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of QualitJ' in Son-Sales Cases, 57 Colum. L. Rev. 653 (1957)). In another non-sale-of-goods 
case. this Court noted that "reasoning by analogy does not require us to apply Article .2 in toto ... ; 
rather \ve need apply only those provisions v.;hich are sufficiently analogous." Glenn Dick 
Equipment Co. v. Galey Construction, Inc., 97 Idaho 216, 222, 541 P.2d 1184. 1190 (1975). This 
Court continued: "We will look to the commercial setting in \vhich the problem arises and ... use 
Article 2 as a premise for reasoning only \vhen the case involves the same considerations that 
gave rise to the Code provisions and an analogy is not rebutted by additional antithetical 
circumstances." Id. at 222, 541 P.2d at J 190 (quoting Note, The Uniform Commercial Code as a 
Prernisefor Judicial Reasoning, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 880, 888 (1965)). 
B. Actual knowledge trumps the need for disclaimer to he "conspicuous." 
U.c.c. 2-316(2) states that in order to exclude or modify implied watTanties, or any part 
thereof, the language must mention the warranty (whether merchantability, fitness for a 
particular purpose, or in this case, habitability), and if there is a writing, it must be conspicuous. 
"Conspicuousness" is a term of art under the code, and is defined in Section 1-201 (10) as 
follows: 
A term or clause is conspicuous when it is so written that a reasonable person against 
whom it is to operate ought to have noticed it. A printed heading in capitals (as: NON-
NEGOTIABLE BILL OF LADI1\"G) is conspicuous. Language in the body of a form is 
'conspicuous' if it is in larger or other contrasting type or color. But in a telegram any 
stated term is 'conspicuous.' vVhether a term or clause is conspicuous or not is for 
decision by the court. If 
The official GCC comment to this definition states that the term means to be "attention-
calling ... [b Jut the test is whether attention can reasonably be expected to be called to it." And the 
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reason for this requirement of conspicuity is found under the commcnt number one to VCC 2-
316 which states that the Section is intended to allow exclusion of implied warranties only by 
conspicuous language "or other circumstances \vh1ch protect the buyer from slllprise." 
(emphasis added). There are numerous cases illustrating what such "other circumstances" might 
look like. In C. S. Fibres v. Proctor & Sc!nvart:::. 509 F..~d 1043 eCA 6 1975), the court found 
exclusionary language in standard size type effective where the caption "LIABILITY CLAUSE" 
was in bold ty-pe and the evidence indicated buyer had reviewed the exclusion. Smith v. 
Sharpensteen, 521 P.2d 394 (Okl.I974), likewise held effective a disclaimer in inconspicuous 
print relying on its title of "No \Varranty" and buyer's having been required to read it. 
(Emphasis original). But the common thread in these cases was articulated in Tennessee-
Carolina Transport v. Strick. 283 N.e. 423, 196 S.E.2d 711 (1973), that a disclaimer should not 
be declared inoperative for inconspicuousness without inquiring whether the buyer was 
protected from surprise by factors bearing upon matters other than the physical appearance of 
the clause itsclf, e. g .. actual awareness of a disclaimer running between non-consumer parties of 
substantially equal bargaining power. See also: Williams v. College Dodge. II V.e.e. Rep. Servo 
(Mich. Dist. CL 1972) (emphasis added). See also: Section 2-316 by virtue of "other 
circumstances which protect the buyer from surprise." Cf. V.e.e. 2-316, Comment 1. In short, 
common sense must prevail, as it did in the case of Fargo Alach. & Tool CO. V. Kearney & 
Trecker Corp., 428 F. Supp. 364, 372 (Dist. Court, ED Mich, 1977) \vhere the court found that 
"actual awareness and apparent endorsement of the provisions obviates any need for 
conspicuousness in order to prevent surprise." See also: Care v. Dover Corp .. 790 SW 2d 559, 
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562 (Texas, 1990) (stating that: "a disclaimer contained in text undistinguished in typeface, size 
or color within a fonn purporting to grant a warranty is not conspicuous, and is unenforceable 
unless the buyer has actual knO\vledge of the disclaimer." (Emphasis added). 
The key fact on appeal is that it was Respondents, );OT Appellants \vho drafted the 
purchase and sales agreement. I Of course, the document was not personally drafted by 
Respondents as it was a fonn approved by the Idaho Association of Realtors, however, the 
Restatement of Contracts imputes "drafter" status to any party "who supplies the words or from 
whom a writing otherwise proceeds." Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 206. FUJihermore, it 
is well settled law in Idaho that contract language is construed most strongly against the party 
who prepares the contract. ~Verry v. Phillips Petroleum Co .. 97 Idaho J 30, 540 P.2d 792 (1975); 
Dale's Service Co .. Inc. v. Jones. 96 Idaho 662, 534 P.2d 1102 (1975); Dunford v. [/nited of 
Omaha. 95 Idaho 282, 506 P.2d 1355 (1973); Big Butte Ranch. Inc. v. Grasmick. 91 Idaho 6, 415 
P .2d 48 (1966). 
As Respondents have based their entire appeal largely on the lack of conspicuousness of 
the warranty disclaimer - they should not prevail because, as stated above, there is no need for a 
disclaimer to be conspicuous when Respondents already knew of its existence. Indeed, it is 
disingenuous for Respondents to claim surprise by (or lack of any knmvledge of) any provision 
of a self-authored contract: Because Respondents had either actual knowledge, or shall be 
imputed knO\,vledge (constructive), they cannot evade equity, justice, or general notions of 
1 SeC: Tr.. p. 56. II. 21 ·25: p. 5". 11 ! -8 i5fafmg that R~spondC'nts' fe3! estate agt:nt. 'OT Arrdlanrs or theIr agent. prepared the (:(In!rac!~. Tr .. r ! 5, ! I :2 1-25: p 16. 1 1 (stating 
that Rc~pondent5 signed the purchases and sales ag:rc~mcllt and then conveyed it to the seller). 
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fairness on a mere technicality regarding specific type settings or fonts. 
Besides the fact that Respondents drafted the agreement (containing the \varranty 
disclaimer), they also had their own agent. practicing real estate more than 30 years. to guide 
them through the real estate transaction. Testimony at trial demonstrated clearly that 
Respondents' agent was a professional real estate agent having been licensed for over 30 years.2 
Respondents' agent knew and understood the contents of the purchase and sales agreement 
(including the disclaimer provision) and was ready and able to explain that provision, among 
others, to Respondents.] And Respondents' agent did in fact explain the contract to them." That 
fact. coupled \vith the Respondents' testimony at trial that he read the contract. understood it,S 
and initialed each page of the contract,6 allows for the inference to be drawn that if Respondents 
failed to ask their real estate agent about the provision disclaiming the implied warranty of 
inhabitability, it is because they already understood it. And, the Court can make such an 
inference as it is a question of fact presumably detennined by the jury at trial, and according to 
the case of Leavil v. S"min, 133 Idaho 624, 628, 991 P.2d 349, 353 (1999) all reasonable 
inferences must be drawn in favor of the party opposing J:-';OV. 7 
3. Respondents failed to demonstrate breach of warranty. 
Even if the implied warranty of inhabitability was not validly disclaimed, there are a 
2 TL. p. 109, 11.22w23. 
3 Te. p. !25. II. !8~25. P. 1:()~t2() 
4 Tr.. p. 5R, II. R-IO 
5 Tr. p. 66, I. 25 p. n-: T •. I Istiltmg "C), ·\nd you understood the language ofthc- contract: ('orrcc(l r\' Y.:s") 
6 Te. p. 57 .11 24,25 p 5R, II. 1-3 
'7 Staling that the party movillg f(lf 1\.:0\" "admits the tmth ()f all the arlver:;e <;!vldence and all inferences thar can be drawn leglt1mately from iT .. 
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number of additional inquiries that should have been analyzed prior to the trial court entering 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict and order of new trial: 1) Did Respondents even 
demonstrate that the home was not habitable? 2) Was there actually any breach? 3) Did 
Respondents prove causation? 
First Respondents did not demonstrate that the prcmlses \vere ever rendered 
uninhabitable. Instead, trial testimony was very clear to the contrary. Respondents testified that 
they never moved out of the home and it is still used as their primary residence. Furthermore. the 
trial testimony was clear that only a small percentage of the overall home \vas affected by the 
alleged water damage, but there was no evidence offered to indicate that the damages to the 
basement made the rest of the home non-habitable due to any health concerns, or for any other 
reason. Besides, the implied warranty of habitability does not impose upon the builder an 
obligation to deliver a perfect house. Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 91, Idaho 55, 68,4 I 5 P. 2d 698, 7 I 1 
(1966). "0:0 house is built without defects, and defects susceptible of remedy ordinarily would 
not warrant rescission." Jd. Instead, only major defects which render the house unfit for 
habitation which are not readily remediable entitle the buyer to relief. [d. In the case at hand, 
Appellants installed a leaching system that remedied any sub-water issues that may have arisen. 
Such action, proving to be "readily remediable" prevents Respondents ability to seek relief. As 
will be noted, infra, the leaching system worked to eliminate any sub-water issues for over a year 
until the actions of Respondents themselves caused that system to fail resulting in the damages 
alleged in this case. 
Second, Respondents, as Plaintiffs, had the duty to prove a brcach of any implied 
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v.:alTanty of habitability and failed to do so. In an action for breach of an implied warranty, the 
buyer has the burden of establishing the breach by a preponderance of the evidence. Dickerson v. 
"'fountain View Equiprnent Co .. 109 Idaho 71 L 716, 710 P.2d 621, 626 (Ct.App. 1985). And 
such a question is for the trier of fact. Martineau v. Walker. 97 Idaho 246, 542 P.2d 1165 (1975). 
As a factual, not legal. issue - the trial court should not have granted a judgment notwithstanding 
the verdict or ordered a ne\v trial. These questions of breach were within the domain of the jury 
to decide and the verdict should not have been displaced. According to Leavil. the applicable 
standard for J~OV is whether there is substantial evidence upon which the jury could have found 
for the non-moving party. Leavit v. Swain, 133 Idaho 624, 628, 991 P.2d 349,353 (1999). Such a 
standard is quite 100v and was met by Appellants as discussed herein. 
Third. even if Respondents factually met the threshold for the jury to find a breach, there 
was complete failure to establish causation which prevents Respondents from prevailing at trial. 
Respondents failed to produce testimony at trial proving that the flooding was due to sub-water 
at all. Instead, Respondents relied on the fact that sub-water issues are common in Jefferson 
County. It is just as likely that the source of the flooding was the result of an unattended water 
hose, a nearby fanner's canal, or any other act of nature but it cannot be assumed to be caused by 
sub-water \vithout a factual showing by Respondents/Plaintiffs at trial. And even if the sub-water 
was the culprit, neither can we assume that Respondents were not responsible for misuse, 
neglect. or damage to the equipment that was installed to guard against sub-water problems. 
In fact, there is evidence within the trial record offered by Appellants of an alternate 
explanation for the cause of the basement flooding; that Respondents may have accidently cut 
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the water line to the leaching system ,vhen putting in their sprinkler system, which explanation is 
reasonable because there were no sub-water problems for over a year after the sale until such 
time as Respondents began landscaping and refused Appellants access to the premises. If this 
were the case, the leaching system would have failed as a result of Respondents' actions 
resulting in the flooding damages alleged in this case. 8 
CO~CLUSIO~ 
The controlling distinction between the duty of the court and that of the jury is that the 
fonner is the duty to detennine the law and the latter to determine the facts. See: Dimick v. 
Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474 (1935). The trial court erred in this case by granting a new trial on the 
issue of habitability (and disclaimer thereof) perceiving it to be an issue of law where no legal 
issue actually existed. The trial court failed to recognize that Respondents had actual notice of 
the provision disclaiming the warranty of habitability by virtue of the fact that, among other 
things, it was Respondents who drafted the purchase and sales agreement containing said 
disclaimer. Therefore, the disclaimer was not required to be printed in a conspicuous way. 
Accordingly, the trial court's initial refusal to give any jury instruction requiring that the font be 
"conspicuous" was correct and the subsequent J)';QV/new trial order was therefore an error. 
While Respondents correctly point out that jury instructions are generally questions of 
law, only prejudicial errors ollmv require the district court to grant a new trial under Rule 
59(a)(7). See: Rockefeller v. Grabmv (cited above). Without conceding that Appellants had any 
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duty to Respondents regarding any implied \varranty of habitability, because such \vere 
effectively disclaimed, Appellants vehemently assert that even if such a duty existed, it \vas not 
breached therefore, any legal ruling by the trial court to omit a certain jury instruction was not 
prejudicial. There was sufficient evidence presented at trial by Appellants that was not based on 
the previous point of la\v. Therefore, the same verdict most likely would have been reached even 
if the refused instruction had been given by the trial court. 
Furthermore, there was no breach of the implied warranty of habitability because 
Respondents failed to prove at trial that the home was rendered uninhabitable or that the alleged 
damages were caused by Appellants on account of the alleged breach. Those are questions of fact 
\vhich the jury decided in favor of Appellants. Additionally, there was sufficient and substantial 
evidence within the record to justify and uphold the jury's verdict especially in light of the low 
preponderance standard governing jury verdicts. Finally, all reasonable inferences must be drawn 
in favor of the party not moving for JNOV bolsters the case against JNOV and a new trial. Under 
the facts and circumstances of the case articulated herein, the trial cOUli had no basis in la\v to 
derogate the jury's decision; and, it should not have disturbed the verdict. 
As previously argued in Appellant's initial brief, Appellants prevailed at trial and are 
entitled to fees and costs at that level (which was held in abeyance by the trial court). Likewise, 
appellants should prevail before this Court, further fees and costs should be granted to 
Appellants on appeal as \vell. 
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